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We report on two independent failures to conceptually
replicate findings by Ballard & Lewandowsky (Ballard and
Lewandowsky 2015 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 373, 20140464
(doi:10.1098/rsta.2014.0464)), who showed that certainty in,
and concern about, projected public health issues (e.g. impacts
of climate change) depend on how uncertain information is
presented. Specifically, compared to a projected range of
outcomes (e.g. a global rise in temperature between 1.68C and
2.48C) by a certain point in time (the year 2065), Ballard &
Lewandowsky (Ballard and Lewandowsky 2015 Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. A 373, 20140464 (doi:10.1098/rsta.2014.0464))
showed that focusing people on a certain outcome (a global rise
in temperature of at least 28C) by an uncertain time-frame
(the years 2054–2083) increases certainty in the outcome, and
concern about its implications. Based on two new studies that
showed a null effect between the two presentation formats,
however, we recommend treating the projection statements
featured in these studies as equivalent, and we encourage
investigators to find alternative ways to improve on existing
formats to communicate uncertain information about future
events.1. Introduction
Scientists, policy-makers and public health organizations
frequently communicate information about climate change and
other public health issues in probabilistic terms. For example, to
communicate the seriousness of globally rising mean temperature,
communicators may use a statement that ‘it is extremely likely
that by 2065, average global surface temperature will rise between
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Figure 1. Example of time-uncertain framing.
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21.68C and 2.48C’ [1]. The diffuse nature of the temperature projection, although scientifically accurate,
likely interacts with the human cognitive system in undesirable ways. A general optimism bias [2,3], or
motivated reasoning [4], may result in an over-focus on the lower value of the temperature range,
resulting in reduced certainty the projection is real and in reduced concern. In a similar vein, Mishra
et al. [5] demonstrated the tendency for people to use vague or ambiguous information in motivationally
biased ways in the realm of consumer behaviour and performance.
To remedy the potentially negative consequences of the use of uncertain information in
communicating the seriousness of climate risks, Ballard & Lewandowsky [1] devised a novel variant
of the typical format that they argued to be more convincing. Instead of focusing audiences on a
range of likely outcomes (e.g. 1.6–2.48C) by a certain point in time (e.g. 2065), Ballard &
Lewandowsky [1] reasoned that focusing audiences on a certain outcome (e.g. at least 28C) within a
range of years (e.g. 2054 and 2083) would counteract the tendency for people to engage in optimistic
thinking. Ballard & Lewandowsky reasoned that communicating a certain climate outcome, albeit
within an uncertain time-frame, may reduce the psychological distance of climate change in
perceivers’ minds [6]. Specifically, work testing construal-level theory [6] supports the notion that
events that are framed as occurring in the distant future are cognitively represented in an abstract
manner, relative to more proximal events. Abstract representations may reduce feelings of alarm and
concern when processing information, reducing the tendency to judge risk as serious. Similarly, in
addition to temporal distance, the vagueness of outcomes may undermine concern by further
increasing abstraction. Thus, a focus on a certain effect expected within an uncertain time-frame, as
devised by Ballard & Lewandowsky, may increase certainty and reduce the overall abstractness of a
given future risk, while communicating the same underlying information as the traditional focus on a
range of outcomes by a certain time (figure 1 for an example).
An experimental test of this prediction yielded positive results. Ballard & Lewandowsky found that
participants who encountered a prediction of a certain outcome within an uncertain time-frame,
compared to participants who encountered an uncertain outcome by a certain time, judged the
climate threat as more serious, and gave stronger endorsements of the need for federal and state
governments to act to mitigate climate change [1].
Given the significant policy implications of these results for communicating uncertain information
about future events, we sought to submit these findings to several rigorous, conceptual replications. In
study 1, we sought to conceptually replicate Ballard & Lewandowsky’s [1] work by addressing
methodological ambiguities in the initial study and vary the temporal focus of projections, allowing
for a direct test of implications of construal-level theory [6]. Specifically, a trade-off exists between
communicating a lesser outcome (for example, a relatively lower rise in global surface temperatures)
at a closer point in time (for example, around 2035), and communicating a larger outcome at a more
distant point in time (featured in the original study). Increasing the temporal proximity of a risk, as
explained earlier, should reduce its relative abstractness, potentially increasing feelings of certainty
and concern about an issue. By including this trade-off as a factor in a replication study, we tested
whether relative temporal proximity to a projected outcome would increase people’s certainty that the
outcome is real, and concern about the issue. In study 2, we sought to extend the novel uncertainty
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
3framing introduced by Ballard & Lewandowsy [1] to a domain of public interest unrelated to climate
change, namely disease projections.
Contrary to our expectations, however, we failed to conceptually replicate Ballard & Lewandowsky’s
[1] initial findings, in studies conducted by two independent teams of investigators. Specifically, we
found the two formats of the projection statements to yield equivalent outcomes in the climate change
and disease domains. For practitioners and academics active in domains involving the public
understanding (and dissemination of) scientific information, improvements in science communication
methods should ideally be robust, in that they ought to reliably improve outcomes over existing
methods, across domains of application and with changes made to specific instructions and
informational contexts. Although the framing of an uncertain outcome as ‘when, not if’ has
considerable intuitive appeal, we were unable to find replicable empirical support for it. We therefore
encourage investigators to find alternative ways to counteract the tendency for many people to
motivationally distort uncertain information about future events.R.Soc.open
sci.6:1804752. Overview of Experiment 1
The first experimental replication sought to address several methodological ambiguities in the initial
Ballard & Lewandowsky [1] experiment that may have influenced the results. Specifically, Ballard &
Lewandowsky dismissed respondents who failed any of four attention checks, likely resulting in a
sample of respondents with an overall higher need for cognition than the average population [7].
A higher need for cognition may result in more systematic processing of information and be an
unmeasured precondition for the effect. Because no further data were collected from participants who
failed any of the attention checks, a test of the role of attention in obtaining the results was not
possible in the original study. Secondly, the length of the text accompanying the graphs/statements
communicating a certain outcome was initially somewhat shorter than the text accompanying the
graphs/statements communicating a certain time projection, potentially reducing the processing
burden in one condition and increasing the appeal of the novel presentation format. The length of the
traditional introduction covering uncertain outcomes was around 270 words and the length of the text
covering uncertain time projections around 120 words. The longer introduction covered several more
examples of negative effects associated with climate change and was overall wordier without,
however, substantially altering the information. The initial study also lacked a control group, reducing
the ability to determine the relative magnitude of the effect.
In Experiment 1, we addressed the above concerns by including a control group, employing US units
and a broader sample of respondents, including those that failed to show full attention. Additionally,
we sought to increase the practical use of the novel presentation format by reducing the length of the
instructions that accompanied the graphs in the initial study. Finally, we varied the temporal
proximity of projections. Depending on the condition, respondents either saw a relatively closer
projection in time, or a relatively distant projection, hypothesizing that proximal projections would
elicit greater certainty and concern than distant projections. The distant projection statement was
identical to the one featured in Ballard & Lewandowsky.3. Methods (Experiment 1)
3.1. Participants
Five hundred and thirteen (age 18þ) respondents completed the experiment using the QualtricsTM platform
in August of 2015. Table 1 lists relevant demographics for the sample. We recruited respondents using an
online panel administered by Survey Sampling International (SSI) covering the geography of the United
States. The panel provided by SSI is methodologically similar to the Qualtrics panel used in the original
Ballard & Lewandowsky [1] study. Both panels employ large numbers of US adults as panel members
and use propensity weighting to achieve a sample balanced to match the geography of the United States.
3.2. Materials
The materials were generally fashioned after the original Ballard & Lewandowsky experiment. Changes
primarily addressed the methodological issues listed above, including length of instructions,
measurement scales and a novel manipulation of the temporal distance of projected climate change
Table 1. Relevant demographics (Experiment 1) (N ¼ 513).
demographics subgroups statistics (%)
gender male 37.90
female 52.40
missing 9.50
age average 42.75
party republican 18.20
democrat 38.80
other 9.40
missing 9.5
education less than bachelor’s degree 48.20
bachelor’s degree 27.20
higher than bachelor’s degree 15
missing 9.70
marital status married 46.20
single 27.70
other 16.70
missing 9.50
income ,$50.000 38.80
.¼$50.000 51.50
missing 9.70
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4effects. The survey was divided into three sections: training materials, manipulations and post-test
measures.
Training materials included three paragraphs and questions serving as general attention checks. In
essence, these questions, if answered correctly, show that participants read the passage with a high
degree of attention-focus, rather than simply skimming the passages. To introduce the manipulation,
the material included a graph showing the decline in the number of emperor penguins over time. The
number of emperor penguins was deemed to be sufficiently dissimilar from the climate measures
used for the main manipulation to avoid priming while being sufficiently similar for people to grasp
the general idea of the projection formats. Depending on the condition, participants saw a graph with
a certain time/uncertain decline in the population or a graph with an uncertain time/certain decline
(figure 2). Following the graphs, we probed for comprehension of the graphs using two questions,
requiring participants to make judgements based on information in the graphs (e.g. how likely is it
that there will be 1000 breeding emperor penguin pairs in the year 2090).
Next, participants viewed the experimental manipulations—graphs labelled ‘Temperature Increases’
and ‘Sea-level Rise.’ Each manipulation included relatively brief descriptions of the history and causes of
temperature and sea-level rises. The information sections included fewer examples of causes, to reduce
the burden for the respondents, but otherwise did not differ significantly from the original study.
Note that Ballard & Lewandowsky’s [1] original experiment included four separate projections of
climate change impacts (global temperature, sea-level rise, ocean acidification and reductions in Arctic
sea ice). To reduce respondent burden, we conducted our replication using only projections of global
temperature and sea-level rises.
A 2 (temporal focus: distant versus close)  2 (projection format: certainty of outcome versus
certainty of time) factorial design formed the basis of the experiment. All projections were based on
actual scientific estimates. Distant projections either mentioned a certain time (2065 for temperature
and 2072 for sea-level rise) or a time range (2054–2083 for temperature and 2060–2093 for sea-level
rise). Proximal projections included certain times of 2035 for temperature and sea-level rise, or ranges
of 2027–2045. Again, depending on conditions, participants either saw uncertain effects (e.g.
‘Scientists project that by 2065, global average surface temperature will rise by 2.98 to 4.38 Fahrenheit’;
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Figure 2. Example of Emperor penguin training.
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5‘Scientists project that by 2072, sea level will rise by 14 to 27 inches’), or certain effects (e.g. ‘Scientists
project that global average surface temperature will rise by 3.68 Fahrenheit between 2054 and 2083’;
‘Scientists predict that sea levels will rise by 20 inches between 2060 and 2093’). We adjusted
proximate effects to reflect reductions in magnitude (e.g. ranges of 1.258 to 2.38 Fahrenheit and 4 to 9
inches of sea-level rise) (see electronic supplementary materials). Following each manipulation, we
measured respondents’ perceived clarity of the figures, the effort required to comprehend them, and
levels of certainty and concern about the information (each on a 9-point scale).
The post-test section featured various demographic measures, and 20 additional questions about
aspects of climate change and weather events, which served as additional dependent variables. These
included questions about whether climate change is happening, respondents’ assessment of causes
and impacts, how certain and concerned they are about climate change, and what should be done
about it. An example statement measuring certainty was ‘How certain are you that sea levels will rise
by 8 inches between 2025 and 2045?’; an example statement measuring concern was ‘How concerned
are you by the above projection?’. Both measures were anchored on 9-point scales, ranging from ‘not
at all’ to ‘extremely’ (see electronic supplementary materials).
3.3. Procedure
Respondents could complete the survey on personal computers or tablets. After indicating consent,
participants read 3 passages serving as attention checks. Respondents had to check particular answer
choices to show evidence of a high degree of attention. Respondents were allowed to continue,
regardless of responses to these checks. Following the checks, participants were randomly assigned to
the four conditions varying certainty of times and outcomes and distance of the projections. A short
passage gave background on each of global temperature and sea-level rises, before the presentation of
the corresponding projection statements, graphs and comprehension checks. Following the
manipulation, respondents then completed post-tests and demographic measures. A fifth group,
which completed only the post-test, served as an experimental control group.
4. Results (Experiment 1)
35.8% of respondents passed all three of the attention checks included at the beginning of the study
(50.2% passed check 1, 42.8% passed check 2 and 66.7% passed check 3), and 36.3% passed both
comprehension checks included in the manipulation, regarding the penguin population. In the
Table 2. Results from multiple regression analyses (Experiment 1). Note: values are standardized coefﬁcients.
certainty concern
gender 20.03 20.043
age 20.133* 20.092
race 20.062 20.073
education 0.067 0.021
income 20.001 0.03
ideology 20.077 20.241***
party ID 20.261*** 20.216***
adj. R2 9.10% 16.30%
attn checks 20.139* 0.006
total time 0.014 0.081
penguin Qs 20.093 20.117
effort 0.005 20.077
clarity 0.365*** 0.246***
adj. R2 22.70% 23.70%
focus 0.012 20.052
timing 0.078 20.071
interaction 20.18 0.016
adj. R2 23.60% 24.20%
*p, 0.05; **p, 0.01; ***p, 0.001.
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
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6original Ballard & Lewandowsky [1] experiment, 45 of 234 (19.2%) qualified participants failed any of
four separate attention checks, suggesting our participants in the present study showed relatively less
attention. We inquired with SSI, our sample provider for Experiment 1, about the quality of the data.
SSI’s internal research shows that some or all of our three initial attention checks are easily missed by
respondents, who nonetheless subsequently show an adequate level of attention for most survey
purposes [8]. Supporting this notion is our supposition that the attention filters employed by
Ballard & Lewandowsky in their original experiment required relatively less involvement and focus.
Compared to the original Ballard & Lewandowsky experiment, who used relatively simple multiple-
choice questions without introductory text (e.g. What is 2 þ 3?), our attention checks required active
reading of instructions. Relatedly, participants in online studies tend to read in an ‘F’ pattern, rather
than reading every sentence, suggesting a lighter attention-focus. Thus, it appears that the nature of
the attention filters used in Experiment 1, compared to the original experiment, contribute to the high
attention-focus failure-rate of Experiment 1. Crucially for the present purpose, two multiple regression
analyses, regressing the number of correct responses to the attention checks and penguin
comprehension questions as separate indicators on the two response variables, (a) certainty that the
climate projections will occur and, (b) concern about the projections, revealed nonsignificant or opposite
patterns (table 2). Attention checks showed a negative coefficient beta for certainty (b ¼ 20.139, p,
0.05) and a null effect for concern (b ¼ 0.006); the penguin measure a null effect for both
(b_concern ¼ 20.093; b_worry¼ 20.117, both n.s.).
As the multiple regression results in table 2 reveal, neither the independent effect of temporal distance
(focus), nor the effect of projection format (varying certainty of outcomes or times), nor their interaction
reached statistical significance.
To replicate more directly the original conditions of Ballard & Lewandowsky [1], we repeated the
analysis with only those respondents included who passed all three initial attention checks. Table 3
shows means and ANOVA results for this restricted subset of participants, again revealing null results.11To further assess the extent to which attention influenced the effects, we tested whether the amount of attention paid moderated the
effect of focus, timing, or the focus by timing interaction. In no case did attention significant interact with any of these treatment effects.
Table 3. Effects of focus and projection format on certainty and concern about climate projections on a base of respondents
who passed all 3 attention checks (Experiment 1). Note: values are means on a 9-point scale.
focus: distant projection proximal projection F
Ntiming:
certain
time
certain
outcome
certain
time
certain
outcome focus timing focus  timing
certainty that
projections
will occur
6.02 5.64 5.74 4.94 1.03 1.5 0.19 111
concern about
the projections
5.86 5.86 6.33 5.88 0.27 0.21 0.22 111
Table 4. Bayes Factors (and their reciprocals) for a Bayesian regression analysis involving the same predictors and dependent
variables as the frequentist analysis reported in table 2. Note: Bayes Factors (BF) greater than 1 provide evidence for an effect.
Strength of evidence is considered merely anecdotal (1–3); moderate (3–10); strong (10–30); very strong (30–100); or
decisive (.100).
certainty concern
gender 0.17 (6.04) 0.13 (7.50)
age 55.85 8.70
race 0.28 (3.54) 0.26 (3.83)
education 0.12 (7.97) 0.13 (7.99)
income 0.13 (7.97) 0.18 (5.43)
ideology 240.89 1 039 175 052
party ID 362 068 49 182 081
attn checks 0.49 (2.04) 0.17 (5.90)
total time 0.67 (1.48) 0.13 (7.86)
penguin Qs 0.25 (4.06) 0.20 (5.11)
effort 0.14 (7.25) 0.16 (6.25)
clarity 684 439 31.99
focus 0.42 (2.40) 0.13 (7.88)
timing 3.07 1.53
interaction 0.13 (7.80) 0.12 (8.09)
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7Because frequentist statistics are notorious for their inability to provide support for the absence of an
effect, we also conducted a Bayesian analysis using the linear-models functions (generalTestBF and
lmBF) in the BayesFactor package [9] in R. Unlike frequentist techniques, Bayesian statistics permit
comparisons between any pair of statistical models, including ‘null’ models for the absence of effects.
Table 4 shows the results of a Bayesian regression analysis that parallels the frequentist model in
table 2 (with records containing missing values deleted; N ¼ 319). The table entries are Bayes Factors
associated with each predictor tested against the null model (intercept only).
Any Bayes factor (BF) greater than 1 provides evidence in favour of an effect, with values in the range
1–3 considered merely anecdotal, 3–10 considered moderate evidence and anything above 10 considered
strong (10–30), very strong (30–100) or decisive (greater than 100) [10]. Table 3 shows that there is at least
strong evidence for an effect of Ideology, Party ID and Clarity on both outcome variables. For Certainty,
there is an additional strong effect of Age.
Bayes Factors less than one are considered to provide evidence for the absence of an effect, and their
reciprocal (1/BF) is interpretable along the same scale as any BF greater than 1. To illustrate, a BF¼ 0.1
provides strong evidence (1/0.1 ¼ 10) for the absence of an effect, and a BF ¼ 0.01 provides decisive
royalsocietypublishing
8(1/0.01 ¼ 100) evidence for the absence of an effect. Applying this interpretation to table 3 implies
that there was at least anecdotal evidence against the effect of the main experimental variable of
interest, Focus.
To further establish whether any of the experimental variables or their interaction had an effect, we
compared the full model for each dependent variable (i.e. including all predictors in table 3) against a
reduced model that omitted only the experimental variables (Focus and Timing) and their interaction.
The model comparison revealed anecdotal evidence for the absence of any experimental effects for
Certainty (reciprocal BF ¼ 2.70) and very strong evidence of the absence for Concern (42.89). .org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.open
sci.6:1804755. Discussion (Experiment 1)
The present study addressed an important ambiguity in Ballard & Lewandowsky’s [1] initial experiment
about the role of attention-focus (or generally, the need for cognition) to obtain their results. The
inclusion of an attention-check variable in our conceptual replication allowed for a direct test of the
hypothesis that an increased concern about climate-related negative outcomes depends on sufficient
attention-focus to process the materials. The regression analyses shown in table 2 do not support this
notion, nor the initial finding that uncertainty frames involving a certain outcome by an uncertain time
yield more concern about climate change than do uncertainty frames involving uncertain outcomes, yet
certain times. The analysis, on a base of the most attentive participants (those who passed all three
attention checks), did not yield the effect, even though participants should have been highly motivated
to process the graphs and accompanying information. Future research could examine whether the need
for cognition or other motivational variables may affect the processing of the uncertainty information
and the framing of the future projections to increase/decrease concern about public interest issues.
The failure to replicate Ballard & Lewandowsky’s [1] original findings raises important questions
about the viability of the outcome-certain/time-uncertain future projection format as a communication
tool. Even though failing to replicate a result, especially when conducting a conceptual replication,
does not necessarily mean the underlying effect is not real, a close replication failure does suggest the
effect may be fragile, and crucially, may not function better as a practical device in public interest
communications, compared to traditional projection formats.
The present replication also included several simplifications of the instructions, which should have
facilitated a replication, and a theoretical extension of the effect to a more proximal time-frame,
directly testing temporal construal theory. Proximity, in particular, should have facilitated a replication
of the original results, because more proximate threats are more concrete, and therefore, more difficult
to ignore. Our results do not support this notion, perhaps because the proximal projections still did
not appear threatening.
Unlike in the original study, our current replication included only two climate-related impacts
(temperature and sea-level rises), whereas the original experiment included four. It is possible that
participants matured over the course of the original study, and that exposure to relatively more
projection statements facilitates the processing of the information, compared to exposure to fewer
statements. Additional analysis of the present replication results suggests that this may be the case.
The perceived clarity of the figures increased significantly with the second impact, and effort needed
decreased significantly, suggesting that respondents improved their ability to interpret the statements
and figures. Given the possibility of maturation, and to submit the original Ballard & Lewandowsky
[1] results to yet another conceptual replication, we conducted a second experiment. Table 5
summarizes various key differences between the present Experiment 1 and the Ballard &
Lewandowsky [1] experiment.
The second experiment examined the variation of outcome (un)certainty versus time (un)certainty in
the context of fictitious diseases, extending the effect to another domain of public health. This experiment
had been in the planning stages and pretested and even though the findings in Experiment 1 were
negative, we decided to move forward with a domain change. In principle, communication about
uncertainty using the ‘when, not if’ method should increase concern about an issue independently of
context, similarly to how various graphing tools are context-free. To test whether the nature of the
uncertainty statements can be obtained without graphical information, which may not always
be feasible to use for communications (e.g. radio, conversations, podcasts), we decided to omit the
graphs from the manipulation in Experiment 2 and replaced them with verbal instructions about
the projection format. Finally, the second experiment did not feature a training task, because no
unfamiliar graphical information was presented to participants, compared to Experiment 1.
Table 5. Major differences between Experiment 1 and Ballard & Lewandowsky [1].
Experiment 1 Ballard & Lewandowsky [1]
sample provider SSI Qualtrics
climate indicators used temperature; sea-level rise; ocean
acidiﬁcation; reductions in Arctic sea ice
temperature; sea-level rise
no. of attention checks 3 4
total recruited N 513 324
N passing all attention checks 184 189
likely involvement required to
pass attention checks
relatively high (focus on reading
instructions)
relatively low (easy answers, low
effort)
missing values treated with list-wise deletion treated with ‘hot-deck’
imputation in the R package
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
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96. Methods (Experiment 2)
The method, ethics approval from the University of Bristol, and analysis plan were preregistered and
are available at https://osf.io/pcebv/. The preregistration contains an exact copy of all conditions of the
online survey. Any deviations from the preregistered method and analysis plan are explicitly noted below.
6.1. Participants
We contracted Qualtrics.com during May 2016 to collect 100 complete respondents for the online
experiment. Qualtrics(TM) administers Internet surveys to representative samples, and the current pool
of respondents was drawn from the US geography using propensity sampling from a large panel of
residents. Owing to a rapid influx of respondents, Qualtrics returned a larger-than-contracted sample
of 223 completed responses which we used for the analysis. Each respondent had passed two
attention filter questions. Three participants who did not provide final consent at the end of the
survey were removed, yielding a final sample of 220 observations.
6.2. Materials
Wedivided the survey into five sections that each addressed one of the following fictitious diseases: Laerosis,
Ralinosis, Hilenfia syndrome, Gearn’s disease andCerioa. Similar to Experiment 1, each section beganwith a
paragraph providing fictitious information about the relevant disease. At the end of each paragraph, a
statement was presented that described the expected future trends in the disease’s prevalence. For each
disease, one of two statements was presented, chosen at random for each respondent. One statement
expressed the range in possible outcomes that would occur by a given future time point.
For example:3 out of every 100 adults in Africa will be infected with Laerosis this year. We know with high confidence that the
number of Laerosis cases will increase by 2027, the only question is by how much. Current projections are that by
that time between 9 and 14 out of every 100 adults in Africa will be infected with Laerosis.The other statement expressed the range in possible timeframes within which a given outcome would
occur. For example:3 out of every 100 adults in Africa will be infected with Laerosis this year. We know with high confidence that the
number of Laerosis cases will increase to 12 out of every 100 adults in Africa, the only question is when. Current
projections are for this figure to be reached between 2025 and 2030.As in Experiment 1, the two possible statements always reflected the same fictitious trend, so they were
equivalent with respect to the severity of the underlying projection.
6.3. Procedure
After reading an information screen and providing initial consent, participants completed the five sections
in a random order. In each section, the statement that was presented (i.e. outcome uncertainty versus time
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10uncertainty) was randomly determined, reflecting a within-subjects design. After reading the relevant
paragraph and statement, we asked respondents how certain they were that the disease prevalence will
change as projected, and how concerned they were by the projection using a 9-point scale from 1 ¼Not
at all certain/concerned to 9 ¼ Extremely certain/concerned. Several choice items followed that queried
whether the projected change will be good or bad for the population. After completion of the survey,
participants indicated their age and gender before providing final consent.7. Results (Experiment 2)
7.1. Data pre-processing
One respondent inexplicably responded to both uncertainty formats for the same disease, suggesting a
failure of randomization, and was therefore excluded from the analysis. The remaining 219 responses
included one participant whose reported age was 100 (the maximum value of the scale used for a slider
to report age) and a further four participants whose completion times fell more than 3 s.d. above the
mean of 711.7 s. Those outlying observations were also removed, yielding a final set of 214 participants
for analysis. None of the principal results are materially affected if those observations are retained.
7.2. Preregistered analyses
In line with the preregistered analysis plan, we first examined how the two projection formats affected
the certainty and concern items in a within-subjects analysis, averaging across the diseases within
each projection format. For the certainty item, mean ratings (on a scale from 1 to 9) were 5.81 and
5.76 for the time-uncertain and outcome-uncertain formats, respectively. For the concern item, the
mean ratings were 5.78 and 5.73 for the time-uncertain and outcome-uncertain formats, respectively.
We used Bayesian paired-sample (within-subject) t-tests for this comparison, using the Bayes Factor
package [9] in R. The Bayes factors in favour of the null hypothesis were 11.11 and 10.97, respectively,
for the certainty and concern items. The experiment therefore returned strong evidence for the null
hypothesis of no effect of the projection format. Figure 3 illustrates the results by showing the
posterior densities (based on 10 000 MCMC samples) of the difference between projection formats.
To comply with the preregistered analysis plan, we next conducted five independent between-subject
Bayesian t-tests for the five diseases separately. The tests provided at least moderate evidence for the null
hypothesis in each case, with the smallest BF ¼ 4.24 for Laerosis for the certainty item, and the smallest
BF ¼ 3.33 for concern for Hilenfia syndrome.
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11We cross-tabulated the number of responses for the categorical choice item (‘Do you think the rise in
the number of people with [disease X. . .] will be good, bad, or neither good nor bad’?) and found no
differences between the projection formats that would have warranted further exploration. For the
time-uncertain format, 49 responses were ‘good’, and 384 ‘bad’, with a further 93 undecided. For
the outcome-uncertain format, the distribution of responses was 52, 393, and 99 for ‘good’, ‘bad’ and
undecided, respectively (j2(2) ¼ 0.08, p. 0.10).
7.3. Additional analyses
The randomization of projection formats implied that some participants (N ¼ 17) received all diseases in
the same projection format. Those participants necessarily contributed missing observations to the
preregistered within-subject comparisons. We therefore additionally explored a mixed-effect model
using the lmer function in R. This model considered all observations and included fixed effects of
projection format and, fully crossed with that design factor, three further measures of the statistics
presented for each disease; namely, the time range in the time-uncertain condition (e.g. 6 years for
Laerosis; see method section), the time until the projection in the outcome-uncertain condition (e.g. 12
years for Laerosis, using 2015 as the present), the current value of the variable (e.g. 3 for Laerosis),
and the increment from that current value to the projected value in the time-uncertain format (e.g. 9
for Laerosis). The model additionally included a random intercept and a random effect of the
projection format for each participant.
None of the coefficients were found to be significant for the certainty item (largest absolute t ¼ 21.46
for time until projection) or the concern item (largest absolute t ¼ 1.20 for the increment of disease
incidence). We additionally ran the same model on the serious item (How serious of a problem do
you think the increase in the number of people with [disease X] will be. . .), and found that for this
model the effect of increment was significant, t ¼ 2.30, p, 0.05, suggesting that people’s perceptions
of the seriousness of a disease were calibrated to the numerical magnitude of the future increment in
the number of projected patients.8. Discussion (Experiment 2)
Experiment 2, a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 using a series of fictitious diseases, again failed to
show evidence that a framing of future outcomes as time-uncertain, rather than outcome-uncertain,
provides an advantage over the opposite framing method. Similar to the result in Experiment 1,
participants who encountered a time-uncertain, outcome-certain framing about the development of
various diseases showed no difference in the certainty that the information is real and concern for the
diseases, compared to participants who encountered a time-certain, outcome-uncertain framing about
the same diseases.9. General discussion
Ballard & Lewandowsky’s [1] ‘when, not if’ framing of projections represents an intuitively powerful
way to present data to increase feelings of certainty and concern about a wide range of public interest
issues, without changing the underlying data. The initial support for the effectiveness of ‘when, not
if’, compared to the traditional ‘if, not when’, was therefore, unsurprising.
We embarked on the replication studies reported in this article with much confidence that we would
replicate the initial results while improving minor methodological concerns and extending the generality
of the initial finding. The inability to replicate the general effect in Experiment 1 led us to refine the
procedure and switch to a verbal presentation format that we expected to accentuate the difference
between the ‘when, not if’ and ‘if, not when’ framings. Those efforts were supported by several pilot
studies using small sample sizes and conducted in the laboratory, that in the lead-up to Experiment 2
again showed results favouring the ‘when, not if’ framing. We conducted the pretests largely to
examine the clarity of the instructions and materials and conclude that the statistical results of the
pilot studies are random noise. The fact the effect ultimately did not replicate in two studies with
large numbers of respondents in a generally representative survey, including an experiment
employing a preregistered protocol, significantly reduces our confidence in the existence of the effect.
We suggest the following implications for public communicators. Even though we cannot empirically
support the notion that the ‘when, not if’ framing represents an improvement over traditional projection
royalsoc
12formats, we can state confidently that the reframing does not harm public communication about climate,
health, and potentially other issues in the public domain. Practitioners may therefore replace traditional
methods of projecting outcomes with the ‘when, not if’ framing whenever they feel the novel
presentation format may be appropriate.ietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.open
sci.6:18047510. Conclusion
Public support for issues in the public interest may depend on how uncertain information is presented.
We describe studies failing to show improvement of a novel presentation method, but encourage
practitioners to exercise their best judgement in which format to use in their communication attempts.
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